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HOW COPYRIGHT LAW MAY AFFECT POP MUSIC
WITHOUT OUR KNOWING IT
Peter K. Yu*
I. INTRODUCTION
When copyright law is linked to the creation of music-the focus of this
Symposium-interesting questions arise. In the context of classical music, for
example, why could Johann Sebastian Bach "recycle" in his Concerto for Four
Harpsichords the opening phrase in Antonio Vivaldi's Concerto for Four Violins,
Strings and Harpsichord Continuo?' Why could Peter Ilyich Tchaikovsky
include in his 1812 Overture repetitive fragments of La Marseillaise and the
anthem God Save the Tsar! to portray the clash between the French and Russian
armies?2 Would copyright protection in musical works help Wolfgang Amadeus
Mozart avoid poverty and the fate of dying penniless? Or would such protection
instead lead him to behave more like Johannes Brahms and Giuseppe Verdi,
whose creativity slowed down significantly following the introduction of
copyright protection?3
* Copyright © 2014 Peter K. Yu. Kern Family Chair in Intellectual Property Law and Director,
Intellectual Property Law Center, Drake University Law School. The Author is grateful to Brandon
Clark, Kristelia Garcia, K.J. Greene, and Eric Priest for valuable comments and suggestions, and
La'Cee Groetken, Jeffrey Kappelman, Nicholas Krob, and Brooke Yang for excellent research and
editorial assistance. He is also indebted to Al and Bob Kohn and Donald Passman, whose
frequently updated books have been indispensable guides to understanding the music business.
As Ronald Rosen observed:
These two concertos are scored for different solo instruments and are in
different keys (Vivaldi in B minor and Bach in A minor). The pitch (or note)
sequence and the context in which each is used, with each pitch having the
same duration, and with the trills occurring at the same times and places, are
not merely "substantially similar" as that term is used in the copyright law, but
(except for the transposition from one key to another) are also virtually
identical.
RONALD S. ROSEN, MUSIC AND COPYRIGHT 4 (2008) (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 161
("[C]opyright laws had been enacted in the early eighteenth century, and Vivaldi, in his
infringement action against J.S. Bach would have been successful because Bach lifted virtually the
entire contents of Vivaldi's Concerto for Four Violins-note for note, rhythmically and essentially,
harmonically the same, and used it in his Concerto for Four Keyboards.").
2 See id. at 314-15 ("During the course of its twenty-plus minutes, Tchaikovsky quotes portions of
the 'Marseillaise,' before that stirring anthem symbolizing the French army and nation is
overwhelmed by the Russian victory over Napoleon, as the Overture concludes with the 'Czar's
Anthem."').
3 See WILLIAM F. PATRY, How TO Fix COPYRIGHT 36 (2011) ("[A]fter Italian [copyright] laws were
passed, Verdi was able to amass a considerable fortune .... Verdi made so much money he
stopped composing. Johannes Brahms also made considerable sums as a result of the passage of
copyright laws that enabled his publisher to prevent free-riding, and as a result retired early.");
F.M. SCHERER, QUARTER NOTES AND BANK NOTES: THE ECONOMICS OF MUSIC COMPOSITION IN THE
EIGHTEENTH AND NINETEENTH CENTURIES 179-80 (2003) ("Obtaining substantial revenues from
score sales and performance fees, Verdi observed that he no longer needed to be a 'galley slave'
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Outside classical music, one can also ask important questions about the
appropriate boundaries for digital sampling-the practice of copying and
remixing sounds into a new musical work, usually in the hip-hop genre.' In
Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films,5 for instance, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found infringing the copying of a "three-note P-
Funk guitar riff" by way of sampling of a sound recording.' The recording at
issue was "Get Off Your Ass and Jam" by George Clinton, Jr. and the
Funkadelics. As Judge Ralph Guy explained:
Get a license or do not sample. We do not see this as stifling
creativity in any significant way. It must be remembered that if
an artist wants to incorporate a "riff" from another work in his or
her recording, he is free to duplicate the sound of that "rift" in
the studio. Second, the market will control the license price and
keep it within bounds. The sound recording copyright holder
cannot exact a license fee greater than what it would cost the
person seeking the license to just duplicate the sample in the
course of making the new recording. Third, sampling is never
accidental. It is not like the case of a composer who has a
melody in his head, perhaps not even realizing that the reason he
hears this melody is that it is the work of another which he had
heard before. When you sample a sound recording you know
you are taking another's work product.'
Since the mid-1990s, copyright litigation relating to digital sampling has
sent shock waves across the hip-hop industry, unleashing profound changes to
both hip-hop music and copyright licensing.' Under Judge Guy's highly
restrictive approach in Bridgeport, many of those musical works created during
and to compose at a frantic pace. Between 1840 and 1849 (he was thirty-six years old in 1849),
Verdi composed 14 operas. During the 1850s he composed 7, in the 1860s he produced 2, and he
wrote 1 in each of the succeeding three decades.").
4 For discussions of digital sampling, see generally JOANNA TERESA DEMERS, STEAL THIS Music:
How INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AFFECTS MUSICAL CREATIVITY 71-110 (2006); KEMBREW
MCLEOD & PETER DICOLA, CREATIVE LICENSE: THE LAW AND CULTURE OF DIGITAL SAMPLING
(2011).
5 Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005).
6 KEMBREW MCLEOD, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION®): OVERZEALOUS COPYRIGHT Bozos AND OTHER
ENEMIES OF CREATIVITY 112 (2005).
7 Bridgeport Music, 410 F.3d at 801.
8 See MCLEOD & DICOLA, supra note 4, at 141 ("[Bridgeport] marked, for sound recordings, a
return to the no-exceptions, no-nuance approach of Grand Upright [Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros.
Records, Inc.], at least in the jurisdiction of the Sixth Circuit. And since most samples implicate
the sound recording copyright in the song being sampled (if not always the music composition
copyright, as Newton v. Diamond shows), the stark rule of Bridgeport could profoundly affect the
legal environment for sampling."); see also id. at 14-44 (discussing Bridgeport's effect on digital
sampling and creativity).
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what Kembrew McLeod and Peter DiCola referred to as "The Golden Age of
Sampling"9 could not have been commercially released." As Chuck D, the
leader of Public Enemy, lamented: "[The limitations imposed by copyright law]
changed how we had to approach music to the point where we couldn't use
fragments in a song. That's what changed overnight. It would take maybe a
hundred different artists to construct a Public Enemy song, though they are all
unrecognizable."'"I Walter Leaphard, the group's manager, concurred: "We just
flat-out say, 'From now on, no samples.' We don't have the man power or the
legal power or the money to deal with those issues. I'm still fighting and
cleaning up sampling issues from 1991."2
To help us better understand the role of copyright law in the music
business and popular music, this article explores five specific questions: Why do
popular songs usually last for less than five minutes? Why are professional
songwriters dissatisfied with Pandora and Spotify? Why can we bring European
CDs back to the United States? Why can't YouTube videos be created with
blanket licenses offered by the American Society of Composers, Authors and
Publishers ("ASCAP") and Broadcast Music, Inc. ("BMI")? Are digital
9 Id. at 19. According to Paul Miller, a.k.a. DJ Spooky, "some of the key albums and artists from
the golden age include De La Soul's 3 Feet High and Rising, Pete Rock & C. L. Smooth's Mecca
and the Soul Brother, and Public Enemy's It Takes a Nation of Millions to Hold Us Back, among
others." Id.
10 As Kembrew McLeod observed:
You can hear the increasing limitations imposed on mainstream hip-hop
stamped on Public Enemy's music. Between 1988 and 1990, Public Enemy
released what are considered to be two of hip-hop's greatest albums, It Takes a
Nation and Fear of a Black Planet. Public Enemy's production team, the
Bomb Squad, took sampling to the level of high art while still keeping intact its
populist heart. But by the time the group's Apocalypse 91 came out, even the
casual listener could hear a dramatic change. Gone were the manic collages
that distinguished their previous two albums, where they fused dozens of
fragments to create a single song. The new sample-licensing rules didn't
differentiate between collaging small sonic chunks and using entire choruses,
so by 1991 it became economically prohibitive to release a record such as It
Takes a Nation or Fear ofa Black Planet.
MCLEOD, supra note 6, at 68; see also DEMERS, supra note 4, at 10 ("[E]xpensive litigation has
fundamentally changed Public Enemy's sound by making the group unwilling to sample music
anymore."); id. at 118-19 ("When Def Jam Records first released A Nation of Millions, most hip-
hop samples were not licensed at all. To release just one of the songs from A Nation of Millions
today, Public Enemy would have to pay advance licensing fees exceeding half of the amount the
roup expected to earn from sales of the entire album.").
McLEOD, supra note 6, at 68. As Hank Shocklese, Public Enemy's producer, elaborated:
[Unlike the taking of a chunk of a song, as in looping a measure] the kind of
things we were doing.., we were just taking a horn hit here, a guitar riff there;
we might take a little speech, part of a speech over here, a kick snare from
somewhere else. It was all bits and pieces.
Id. at 78.
12 DEMERS, supra note 4, at 119.
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downloads sales or licenses? And as a bonus, this article includes a rather
obscure yet illuminating sixth question: Why does the royalty rate for sheet
music stay at 7¢ per copy?
It is my hope that answering these questions will enable us to develop a
deeper understanding of copyright law and how it can affect both the music
business and popular music. The copyright debate has been repeatedly and
frequently framed as one between different stakeholders. In the area of popular
music, these stakeholders include record labels, music publishers, professional
songwriters, recording artists, individual users, retail stores, 3 online service
providers, and other third-party intermediaries. Because the laws we include in
Title 17 of the United States Code will affect these stakeholders-both directly
and indirectly-they will ultimately affect our music. Thus, the more we
understand the copyright law's impact on the music business-and, by extension,
our culture-the more we will notice the high cultural stakes involved in striking
the proper balance in the copyright system.
II. WHY DO POPULAR SONGS USUALLY LAST
FOR LESS THAN FIVE MINUTES?
Songs in popular music vary in length. While some begin with a
segment of instrumental music and last for as long as seven minutes, others are
short, repetitive, and within the range of three to five minutes. There are many
reasons why songs are of a certain length. These reasons include artistic choice,
historical tradition, past technological constraints, 14 increased radio play, reduced
production costs, practical constraints regarding live performances, and, of
course, the audience's limited attention span (especially for the Twitter
generation). One reason not widely discussed, however, is the role copyright law
may have played in determining the length of a sound recording.
Section 114 of the 1976 Copyright Act, the current U.S. copyright
statute, 5 covers what is generally referred to as the "mechanical reproductions"
of copyrighted music--or, as the statute puts it, the "duplicat[ion of] the sound
recording in the form of phonorecords or copies that directly or indirectly
recapture the actual sounds fixed in the recording."' 6 Such reproductions now
take place in a wide range of media, from vinyl albums to cassette tapes and from
digital tracks to online streams.
13 Instead of Tower Records and Sam Goody (or f.y.e.), today's key retail stores include Amazon,
Best Buy, Target, Walmart, and, of course, the iTunes Store.
14 See ANDRE J. MILLARD, AMERICA ON RECORD: A HISTORY OF RECORDED SOUND 128 (2005)
("The standard Edison cylinders at the turn of the century could play for only about 2 minutes,
while 7-inch discs could play a little longer.").
15 Since its adoption in 1790, the Copyright Act has undergone major revisions in 1831, 1870,
1909, and 1976.
6 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (2012).
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The provision on mechanical reproductions dates back to Section 1 (e) of
the 1909 Copyright Act, which prohibited for the first time the unauthorized
mechanical reproduction of a copyrighted work. 7 As stated in the provision:
[A]s a condition of extending the copyright control to such
mechanical reproductions, That whenever the owner of a musical
copyright has used or permitted or knowingly acquiesced in the
use of the copyrighted work upon the parts of instruments
serving to reproduce mechanically the musical work, any other
person may make similar use of the copyrighted work upon the
payment to the copyright proprietor of a royalty of two cents on
each such part manufactured, to be paid by the manufacturer
thereof; and the copyright proprietor may require, and if so the
manufacturer shall furnish, a report under oath on the twentieth
day of each month on the number of parts of instruments
manufactured during the previous month serving to reproduce
mechanically said musical work, and royalties shall be due on
the parts manufactured during any month upon the twentieth of
the next succeeding month. The payment of the royalty provided
for by this section shall free the articles or devices for which
such royalty has been paid from further contribution to the
copyright except in case of public performance for profit .... "
Section l(e) was enacted in response to the United States Supreme Court
case of White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co. 9 In this celebrated case,
the Court found that the manufacture of player piano rolls did not result in the
creation of a "copy" of the copyrighted work.20 As a result, the manufacturer did
not need to obtain a license from the relevant copyright holders. As Justice
William Day reasoned:
It may be true that in a broad sense a mechanical instrument
which reproduces a tune copies it; but this is a strained and
artificial meaning. When the combination of musical sounds is
reproduced to the ear it is the original tune as conceived by the
author which is heard. These musical tones are not a copy which
appeals to the eye. In no sense can musical sounds which reach
us through the sense of hearing be said to be copies, as that term
is generally understood, and as we believe it was intended to be
17 Copyright Act of 1909 § l(e), ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (repealed 1976).
18 id.
19 White-Smith Music Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908).20 Seeid. at 18.
2014]
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understood in the statutes under consideration. A musical
composition is an intellectual creation which first exists in the
mind of the composer; he may play it for the first time upon an
instrument. It is not susceptible of being copied until it has been
put in a form which others can see and read. The statute has not
provided for the protection of the intellectual conception apart
from the thing produced, however meritorious such conception
may be, but has provided for the making and filing of a tangible
thing, against the publication and duplication of which it is the
purpose of the statute to protect the composer.2'
In the end, the Court declared: "These perforated rolls are parts of a machine
which, when duly applied and properly operated in connection with the
mechanism to which they are adapted, produce musical tones in harmonious
combination. But we cannot think that they are copies within the meaning of the
copyright act. 22
To overturn White-Smith, Congress enacted Section l(e) of the 1909
Copyright Act and extended coverage to the mechanical reproductions of a
copyrighted work. Nevertheless, it feared that the Aeolian Company, the most
dominant manufacturer of piano rolls at the time, would have a quasi-monopoly
over mechanical reproductions.23 Congress therefore introduced compulsory
licenses for making such reproductions.24 The rate for these licenses, or
"mechanicals" for short, was set at 2¢ per mechanical copy-"the then
approximate equivalent of 5 percent of the manufacturer's selling price." 25 This
rate remained unchanged for nearly seven decades until 1978, when the 1976
Copyright Act entered into effect.
During the Congressional hearings on this yet-to-enact statute, many
copyright experts, in particular those supporting the music industry, questioned
21 Id. at 17.
22 Id. at 18.
23 Howard B. Abrams, Copyright's First Compulsory License, 26 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH
TECH. L.J. 215, 219-20 (2010) ("Eighty-seven members of the Music Publishers Association
controlling 381,598 compositions had agreed to give the Aeolian Company exclusive rights to
manufacture piano rolls of their copyrighted compositions in return for a royalty of ten per cent of
the retail selling price of the piano rolls.... The Aeolian Company was the dominant manufacturer
of player pianos.").
24 See generally STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., STUDY No. 5: THE
COMPULSORY LICENSE PROVISIONS OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 47 (Comm. Print 1960) (study by
Harry G. Henn) (providing an excellent study on the mechanical royalty provision of the 1909
Copyright Act).
25 Id. at 55; see also id. at 78 ("In 1909, a buyer of records paid anywhere from $1.50 to $7 for 2 to
4 minutes of music. In 1956, a buyer paid 85 cents for 3 minutes and $3.98 (Federal excise tax and
the cost of the album included) for 46 minutes of music." (comments from Ernest Meyers, general
counsel of the Recording Industry Association of America)).
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the fairness of having such a low flat rate.26 As Sydney Kaye, chairman of BMI's
board, declared in his testimony:
The present 2 cents per composition per part of instrument
payment is outmoded for works of long duration. The trade
practice is to pay for such works if included on longplaying
records at the rate of I cent for each 4 minutes with one-quarter
of a cent for additional minutes or factions thereof and a
minimum royalty of 2 cents.2
Sidney Wattenberg, the general counsel for the Music Publishers' Protective
Association (now the National Music Publishers' Association), concurred:
The 2-cent royalty provided for in the statute applies to all
compositions and today with the development of the long-
playing record, it seems to me to be so unfair as to shock the
conscience of a reasonable man that a mechanical company
under the compulsory license provision can record a work such
as George Gershwin's "Rhapsody In Blue" for the same 2-cent
royalty as he is called upon to pay for let us say Elvis Presley's
"Hound Dog.""
When the 1976 Copyright Act finally entered into effect in 1978, the rate
was raised from 2¢ to the greater of "2.75 cents or 0.5 cent per minute of playing
time or fraction thereof."'29 This 2.75¢ rate was further increased to 4¢ in 1981,
4.25¢ in 1983, 4.5¢ in 1984, 5¢ in 1986, 5.25¢ in 1988, 5.7¢ in 1990, 6.25¢ in
1992, 6.6¢ in 1994, 6.95¢ in 1996, 7.1€ in 1998, 7.55¢ in 2000, 8¢ in 2002, and
8.5¢ in 2004.30 The current rate, which took effect on January 1, 2006, is the
greater of "9.1 cents or 1.75 cents per minute of playing time or fraction
thereof."'" Although record labels rarely pay this statutory rate,32 owing to their
26 See id. at 55 ("Whether such royalty rate, assuming it was reasonable in 1909, remains
reasonable today, would appear worthy of reexamination in view of the decreased purchasing
power of money, the subsequently developed types of recordings (assuming the compulsory license
provision be applicable to them), and the substantially increased manufacturer's selling prices.").27 Id. at 70-71.
28 Id. at 76.
29 Copyright Royalty Rates: Section 115, the Mechanical License, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE,
http://www.copyright.gov/carp/m200a.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2014).30 id.
31 id.
32 As Al and Bob Kohn explained:
[B]ecause of the burdensome procedures required by the compulsory license
provision-such as the requirement of monthly, rather than quarterly[,]
accounting to copyright owners and notice conforming to strict regulation-the
2014]
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ability to negotiate for voluntary licenses, this rate has been used as the
benchmark, and often the maximum rate, for most recording and songwriter
agreements.3
Under the current calculation of 1.750 per minute of playing time, 9.1¢
equals the mechanical royalty rate for five minutes and twelve seconds. Thus, if
a song lasts for more than five minutes and twelve seconds, the record label, and
more likely the recording artist, will be required to pay a higher rate for
mechanicals. To be certain, Section 114 of the Copyright Act only allows for the
"duplicat[ion of] the sound recording in the form of phonorecords or copies that
directly or indirectly recapture the actual sounds fixed in the recording."34 The
provision therefore does not govern the situation when the sound recording was
recorded for the first time. In reality, however, the rate for first use is not that
different from the rate for later uses. As noted music lawyer Donald Passman
observed: "Customarily, the publisher doesn't charge more than the statutory
rate, but there's no reason it can't, other than industry custom (and the fact that
no one will pay any more than that)."35
To complicate matters, many recording artists do not have a full budget
to pay for the statutorily stipulated mechanicals for all the songs included in their
album. Oftentimes, recording contracts will include a so-called controlled
composition clause--or "controlled comp clause" for short. 6 Although this
clause was introduced to limit the record label's spending per album and to
facilitate the acquisition of a discounted rate for mechanicals,37 it has the perverse
compulsory license is hardly used. The vast majority of mechanical licenses
issued today are negotiated or voluntary licenses, not true compulsory licenses.
The terms of these voluntary mechanical licenses are given effect, regardless of
whether those licenses strictly reflect the terms of the compulsory license
provision of the Copyright Act.
AL KOHN & BOB KOHN, KOHN ON Music LICENSING 771 (4th ed. 2010); DONALD S. PASSMAN, ALL
You NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE Music BUSINESS 217 (8th ed. 2012) (stating that "compulsory
license is almost never used"); see also Lydia Pallas Loren, Untangling the Web of Music
Copyrights, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 673, 682 n.38 (2003) ("The preference for obtaining licenses
from Harry Fox instead of utilizing the statutory license is largely due to the reduction of
transaction costs offered by Harry Fox. Harry Fox does not require monthly reports and royalty
payments as required by the Copyright Office, using instead quarterly or semi-annual reports and
payments.").
See PASSMAN, supra note 32, at 228-38 (discussing the maximum rate per song and per album in
record deals); id. at 287 (noting the potential requirement in songwriter agreements of the delivery
of "a minimum percentage of [the] statutory rate").
14 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (2012).
35 PASSMAN, supra note 32, at 217.
36 See id. at 227-28 (discussing controlled composition clauses).
37 See KOHN & KOHN, supra note 32, at 787 ("Because many recording artists now tend to write
most of the songs they record, record companies take the opportunity to address the issue of
mechanical licensing directly in the artist's recording contract. These contracts invariably contain a
provision, called a controlled composition clause, which effectively limits the amount of money the
record company is required to pay in mechanical royalties for each album produced by the artist
under the contract."); see also id. at 781 (discussing the practice of "asking for a rate").
370 [Vol. 83:2
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effect of reducing the income recording artists will earn from their own
compositions.
Consider, for example, a recording contract that sets the maximum
mechanical royalties paid for all controlled compositions at seventy-five percent
of the statutory rate.3" Because the current statutory rate is the greater of 9.1 or
1.75¢ per minute, the discounted rate for each controlled composition is 6.825¢ if
no song exceeds five minutes and twelve seconds. If the recording contract
further provides that the record label will only provide for a budget of ten times
the rate for controlled compositions-known generally as a "cap" at the "ten
times rate" 39-the artist's total budget for mechanicals will be 68.25¢ per album.
Assume that the artist is to record only ten three-to-five-minute songs (as
opposed to twelve, which is increasingly common).40 Assume further that she
wrote only five of these songs herself. Under this hypothetical, the artist will
have to allocate 45.5¢ (9.10 times five) of the budget to paying the copyright
holders of those five songs she did not write. The amount she receives for her
own compositions will be the remaining 22.75¢-in other words, 4.55¢ per song
(as opposed to 9.1 ¢ under the copyright statute). If two of those songs she did
not write last for seven minutes, the extra two minutes from these songs will
increase her allocation of the mechanical royalty budget from 18.2¢ to 24.5¢
(assuming the record label does not have a contractual arrangement to limit the
rate to a maximum of 9.1¢ per song). Because the artist now has to pay an
additional 6.3¢ for the longer songs, the budget for her own compositions will be
further reduced to 16.45C-that is, a meager 2.35¢ per song (a little more than a
quarter of what she would have received under the copyright statute).
To be certain, the artist will always have economic incentives to write
longer songs, considering the larger sum of mechanical royalties the extended
length will entitle her to receive. This larger sum will, in turn, compensate for
the reduced royalties she receives owing to the controlled composition clause in
her recording contract. Nevertheless, because other artists and record labels may
be reluctant to record songs that last for more than five minutes and twelve
seconds, it remains debatable whether the additional royalties, as opposed to
creative preferences, would motivate her to write longer songs.41 In fact, many
artists may not even have thought through the complexities surrounding
mechanical royalties and controlled composition clauses.
38 See PASSMAN, supra note 32, at 228-32 (discussing the maximum rate per song in record deals).
" See id. at 232-38 (discussing the maximum rate per album in record deals).
40 If the artist records more than ten songs, the amount allocated to each song will be even lower.
41 Thanks to Brandon Clark and Eric Priest for pushing me on this point.
20141
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III. WHY ARE PROFESSIONAL SONGWRITERS DISSATISFIED
WITH PANDORA AND SPOTIFY?
Through a low monthly subscription fee or the willingness to be
inundated with advertisements, Pandora, Spotify, and other online streaming
services have enabled individual users to listen to music-both songs they like
and those they have not yet discovered.42 These services not only have helped
increase diversity in consumer choice, but also seek to respond to the ever-
changing consumer lifestyle, habits, and preferences. Although this Part lumps
the discussions of Pandora and Spotify together, they offer different types of
services and pay royalties at disparate rates.43
From the standpoint of professional songwriters, however, it is unclear
whether Pandora and Spotify are attractive services. This is particularly true for
those songwriters who do not perform or who prefer to spend more time in the
studio.' On the recent fortieth anniversary of the Swedish group ABBA's
victory in the Eurovision competition, Bj6m Ulvaeus, the group's former
songwriting member, "voiced serious doubts that they would have had the same
success if they started out today. ' 45 As The Guardian reported:
He and his co-writer Benny Andersson were more interested in
writing great songs than going on tour, but did not start out as
fully formed hit songwriters .... It took years of trial and error,
fitae-tuning and studying other songwriters. And, once they
became successful, they'd still write every day, nine to five-
and only end up with 12 songs a year.
Ulvaeus said he doubted spending all that time on
writing songs would be possible in a world where Spotify is the
main source of income . . . , as they would have had to spend
much more time touring in order to make a living.'
42 See Ben Sisario, As Music Streaming Grows, Royalties Slow to a Trickle, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/29/business/media/streaming-shakes-up-music-industrys-
model-for-royalties.html.
43 While the former is largely a non-interactive webcaster, whose rate is set by the Copyright
Royalty Board, the latter is a commercial on-demand streaming service. See PASSMAN, supra note
32, at 140-41 (distinguishing between interactive and non-interactive webcasting).
44 See Peter K. Yu, Digital Copyright and Confuzzling Rhetoric, 13 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 881,
901-07 (2011) (explaining why alternative compensation models that are based on live
performances and merchandise sales will not work for all artists).
45 Helienne Lindvall, The Music Industry Is Divided Over Streaming-and Heading for a Collision,
GuARDIAN (Apr. 30, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/media/media-blog/2014/apr/30/music-
streaming-revenue-pandora-spotify.46 id.
[Vol. 83:2
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Since the arrival of iTunes, Pandora, and Spotify, record labels and
songwriters alike have complained about how the revenue these services provide
is not comparable to what they used to earn through album sales. 7 As Robert
Levine, the former executive editor of Billboard, lamented, the digital transition
has forced record labels and songwriters to "trade analog pennies for digital
pennies. ' With the arrival of Pandora and Spotify, "the river of nickels" from
iTunes has now been further transformed into "a torrent of micropennies."49
On its website, Spotify claims that it "distribut[es] nearly 70% of all the
revenues that [it] receive[s] back to rights holders."5 Combining the free and
premium tiers of service, "an average 'per stream' payout to rights holders [is]
between $0.006 and $0.0084 '  These figures are similar to those reported by
The New York Times: "according to a number of music executives who have
negotiated with the company, [Spotify] generally pays 0.5 to 0.7¢ a stream (or
$5,000 to $7,000 per million plays) for its paid tier, and as much as 90 percent
less for its free tier. 52
Nevertheless, musicians remain dissatisfied with Spotify, as well as
Pandora and other online streaming services. For instance, Taylor Swift recently
removed her entire back catalogue from Spotify, just as her new album 1989 was
released and was on its way to sell more than 1 million copies in the first week. 3
Thom Yorke of Radiohead, who released In Rainbows over the Internet using a
name-your-price model, 4 also withdrew his independent work from the service
47 See ROBERT LEVINE, FREE RIDE: How DIGITAL PARASITES ARE DESTROYING THE CULTURE
BUSINESS, AND HOW THE CULTURE BUSINESS CAN FIGHT BACK 229 (2011) ("I don't see how you'd
get the consumer to agree to pay a sum that would match what we have at present." (quoting
Frances Moore, CEO, International Federation of the Phonographic Industry)); Sisario, supra note
42 ("No artist will be able to survive to be professionals except those who have a significant live
business, and that's very few." (quoting Hartwig Masuch, CEO, BMG Rights Management)). But
see Sisario, supra note 42 (reporting that "a Google executive [saying] . . . that Psy's viral video
sensation 'Gangnam Style' had generated $8 million from YouTube, where it had been watched 1.2
billion times, yielding a royalty of about 0.6 cent a viewing").
48 LEVINE, supra note 47, at 145.
49 Sisario, supra note 42.
50 Spotify Explained, SPOTIFY, http://www.spotifyartists.com/spotify-explained/ (last visited Sept.
29, 2014).
51 Id.
52 Sisario, supra note 42.
53 Hannah Ellis-Petersen, Taylor Swift Takes a Stand Over Spotify Music Royalties, GUARDIAN
(Nov. 5, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/music/2014/nov/04/taylor-swift-spotify-streaming-
album-sales-snub.
54 See PATRIK WIKsTR6M, THE MUSIC INDUSTRY: MUSIC IN THE CLOUD 110 (2009) (providing an
estimate from an Internet market research firm that "the album was downloaded approximately I
million times and 40 per cent of the downloading fans paid on average $6 for the download"); see
also GREG KOT, RIPPED: How THE WIRED GENERATION REVOLUTIONIZED MUSIC 233-40 (2009)
(discussing Radiohead's name-your-price experiment).
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in protest,5 although he did launch a new competing streaming service a couple
of days after the withdrawal. 6
In a candid blog post published on The Guardian, English musician Sam
Duckworth declared:
4,685 Spotify plays of my last solo album equated to £19.22
(that's 0.004p per album stream). The equivalent to me selling
two albums at a show. I think it's fair to say that at least two of
those almost 5,000 listeners would have bought the album from
me if they knew the financial disparity from streaming.57
Damon Krukowski of Galaxie 500 also compared his recent Pandora and Spotify
payouts with the sales of his band's very first single in the late 1980s: "Pressing
1,000 singles in 1988 gave us the earning potential of more than 13 million
streams in 2012.""8 Finally, Bette Midler complained in a tweet that "Pandora
paid her slightly more than $114 for more than 4 million song spins over a three-
month period."59
On top of these frustrated remarks, "publishers and songwriters [have]
question[ed] why record labels should get five to 12 times as much as the writers
when a track is streamed," considering the limited costs incurred by the labels.6"
Although the disagreement between music publishers and record labels over how
to divide the royalties pie is not new, it is worth looking into why Pandora,
Spotify, and other online streaming services have thus far failed to satisfy either
record labels or professional songwriters. This section will focus on the latter.
In his well-argued book, Free Ride, Robert Levine explained the
economics behind music disseminated through Spotify and other online
streaming services:
55 Tim Worstall, Spotify Royalties Appear to Be Awfully High Despite What Thom Yorke Says,
FORBES (July 17, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstaIll2013/07/17/spotify-royalties-
appear-to-be-awfully-high-despite-what-thom-yorke-says/.
56 Tim Worstall, Thom Yorke Launches Music Streaming Service Mere Days After Criticizing
Spotify, FORBES (July 18, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2013/07/18/amaaazing-
thom-yorke-launches-music-streaming-service-mere-days-after-criticising-spotify-the-music-
streaming-service/.
57 Sam Duckworth: Thorn Yorke's Right-Artists Can't Survive on Spotify Streams, GUARDIAN
(July 16, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/music/musicblog/2013/jul/16/thom-yorke-spotify-
ban-right-sam-duckworth.
58 Damon Kruktwski, Making Cents, PITCHFORK (Nov. 14, 2012), http://pitchfork.com/features/
articles/8993-ihe-cloud/.
59 Andy Gensler, Bette Midler Critiques Pandora, Spotify: "Impossible for Songwriters to Earn a
Living", HOLLYWOOD REP. (Apr. 6, 2014), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/earshot/bette-
midler-critiques-pandora-spotify-693961.
60 Lindvall, supra note 45.
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[A] service like Spotify could hurt labels if users who don't
subscribe choose to buy fewer CDs. As an example, let's
imagine a million music fans who spend $60 a year on CDs and
iTunes songs-representing $60 million in retail revenue-but
might cut that amount by a third once they start using Spotify. If
the company can sell subscriptions to 10 percent of its users for
$10 a month, it would generate $12 million in fees; those
100,000 customers would spend another $4 million a year
buying music, for a total of $16 million. But the other 900,000
customers using the service for free will spend only another $36
million. That adds up to $52 million-only $8 million less than
before-except that the first users of Spotify will be the
consumers who now spend the most on music.61
Although Levine believes that the record labels' revenue will eventually increase
with the growth of these services, he forecasted that the labels would have to see
a severe drop in revenue before seeing the revenue rising again:
Consider a streaming music service that charges $5 per month.
Its first customers would be dedicated fans, the consumers who
might now spend $100 or so a month on music. Once they buy a
subscription, they might spend less. In the long run, this might
not matter, because other subscribers-the consumers who now
buy one or two CDs a year-will spend much more than they did
before. The problem is that they might not buy a subscription
for some time.62
Indeed, Roger Entner of Recon Analytics estimated that "streaming music
services should be sustainable when they reach 10 million paying users."63 Until
then, however, professional songwriters are likely to remain dissatisfied with
these services.
To be certain, the decline in songwriters' royalties can be attributed to
both the decline of the music industry and massive unauthorized copying on the
internet. However, one should not overlook the dramatic impact the shift from
the album model to the singles model has on the songwriting business.' Even if
61 LEVINE, supra note 47, at 77-78.
62 Id. at 229-30.
63 Joshua Brustein, Spotify Hits 10 Million Paid Users. Now Can It Make Money?, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (May 21, 2014), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-05-21/why-spotify-
and-the-streaming-music-industry-cant-make-money.
64 Although this Part focuses primarily on economic impact, one can also notice some non-
economic impact. For example, "[flans of the Beatles' classic Sgt. Pepper's Lonely Hearts Club
lamented that the iPod, with its irresistible song-shuffling function, would eliminate the album as
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it remains debatable how much of the recent decline in music sales was caused
by massive online file-sharing,65 there is no denying that such unauthorized
copying has forced the music industry to embrace distribution models that, at
least for now, have resulted in a significant reduction in income. As Robert
Pittman, cofounder of MTV, declared: "Stealing music is not [what's] killing
music. When I talk to people in the music business, most of them will admit the
problem is they're selling songs and not albums. I mean, you do the math."66
To a large extent, the new singles model Apple iTunes ushered in a
decade ago has turned a "high-margin, high revenue model" of $15-to-$18
transactions into a low-margin model of multiple 99¢ sales.67 As Peter Mensch,
who works with Metallica, the Red Hot Chili Peppers, and others acts, declared:
"When they let Steve Jobs roll over us, that was the end. They thought, 'It's
another way to sell music.' But now I'm selling singles when I should be selling
albums."68 A 2007 consulting study funded by the U.K. music industry also
found that "18 percent of the labels' 2004-2007 revenue loss stemmed from
piracy, while the rest was the result of selling music by the track."'69
To make things worse, the early days of the iTunes Music Store did not
allow for so-called variable pricing. As a result, all songs, regardless of their
genre or popularity, were sold at the same 99¢ price.7" The lack of control over
prices, to some extent, has created market distortion that ultimately harms the
record labels' business models. While fixed pricing undoubtedly provides
simplicity and convenience to consumers-the preference of the late Steve
Jobs7 '-it ignores the fact that some songs (and albums) are worth more, and
sometimes significantly more, than others. Before the arrival of iTunes, for
example, record labels frequently differentiated among the different classes of
an art form." STEVE KNOPPER, APPETITE FOR SELF-DESTRUCTION: THE SPECTACULAR CRASH OF THE
RECORD INDUSTRY IN THE DIGITAL AGE 178 (2009).
65 See SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, THE ANARCHIST IN THE LIBRARY: HOW THE CLASH BETWEEN
FREEDOM AND CONTROL Is HACKING THE REAL WORLD AND CRASHING THE SYSTEM 47-48 (2004)
(observing that Eminem, Limp Bizkit, Britney Spears, and NSYNC had all sold more than one
million albums in the first week after release in the height of online file-sharing through Napster);
WIKSTR'M, supra note 54, at 150 ("There has been, and still is, a relatively polarized debate as to
whether it is the copyright infringement enabled by P2P networking and other similar technologies
which has caused the downturn of the recorded music industry."); Felix Oberholzer-Gee &
Koleman S. Strumpf, The Effect of File Sharing on Record Sales: An Empirical Analysis, 115 J.
POL. ECON. 1 (2007) (showing that file sharing has only had a limited effect on record sales); Yu,
Digital Copyright and Confuzzling Rhetoric, supra note 44, at 893 ("[W]ithout empirical proof, it is
hard to know whether downloads actually lead to lost sales. In fact, some evidence seems to
suggest otherwise.").
66 KNOPPER, supra note 64, at 181.
67 LEVINE, supra note 47, at 44-45 (quoting the observation of Hank Barry, Napster's former
interim CEO).681 Id. at 68.69 Id. at 70.
70 See KNOPPER, supra note 64, at 179-80 (discussing the problems created by the lack of variable
pricing on iTunes).
71 See id. at 180.
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music: singles, albums, compilations, "greatest hits," mid-price records, budget
releases, record clubs, box sets, all of which were subject to different royalty
rates. 2  Although the fixed 99¢ rate was eventually replaced in 2009 by a
variable pricing scheme of 69¢, 99¢, and $1.29, 73 the prices of most best-selling
songs were soon raised to the current price of $1.29, leaving again limited price
variations amongst songs of different genres and popularity.
To make the life of professional songwriters even more difficult,
publishing agreements usually require the output for a specified term to be
delivered in exchange for an advance against royalties.74 The term is set up to
enable songwriters to generate enough songs for an album. It is usually based on
either a specified period or a specified number of songs, including those that have
to be recorded and released. If the concerned songwriter fails to deliver enough
songs under the specified term, the output she produces for the next album will
still count toward the yet-to-complete term. It is therefore no surprise that
Donald Passman cautioned songwriters about the term, lest they deliver "two
albums for the price of one."75
Because of the importance for songwriters to obtain an advance, music
lawyers are eager to negotiate for contracts featuring language that will allow the
specified term to move forward-for instance, when the advance has been
recouped or when enough songs have been recorded. They may further negotiate
for the songwriter to receive an additional advance at the beginning of a new
term, especially if the contract for the previous term has already been recouped.76
Advances are attractive because they are rarely returnable, even when they are
recoupable-that is, the songwriter will not be contractually required to return
the advance even if she may not receive additional monies from the publisher for
the songs she has composed during the term.77
72 See PASSMAN, supra note 32, at 151-53, 158-62, 230.
73 Andrew Edgecliffe-Johnson, Apple Brings in Variable Pricing on iTunes, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 6,
2009), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/bccbeedO-dc if-I dd-b07e-000077b07658.html.
74 See PASSMAN, supra note 32, at 282 (discussing the "term" in songwriter agreements).
71 Id. at 287.
76 See id. at 286 ("[Ilf you have clout, you can sometimes get the publisher to move the term
forward if you're recouped, even if you haven't delivered all the songs you promised.").
77 As Al and Bob Kohn observed:
Though the advance is recoupable, it is not returnable (i.e., if the advances turn
out to be greater than the amount of royalties ever earned from sales, the writer
will not have to pay the unearned balance of the advance back to the person
who paid it, unless of course he is otherwise in breach of the agreement ...
however, the advance may be returnable in certain circumstances at the option
of the writer, such as when the writer exercises a reversion of rights provision).
Thus, an advance is more accurately referred to as a "non-returnable,
recoupable advance."
KoHN & KoHN, supra note 32, at 111; PASSMAN, supra note 32, at 85 (stating that "[w]ith very rare
exceptions, advances are nonreturnable").
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In recent years, the privileging of the singles model over the album
model has greatly changed the dynamics of the songwriting business. To begin
with, songwriter agreements for single songs rarely exist, and it is hard to know
in advance whether a particular song will succeed commercially. Even if the
songwriter manages to obtain a contract for single songs, the advance provided
by such a contract is likely to be very limited-in the range of hundreds of
dollars as opposed to tens, or even hundreds, of thousands of dollars.78
Moreover, for contracts featuring specified terms, it remains unclear when the
specified term will move forward (assuming that the contract allows for such a
move). For example, if the contract requires recording by an artist from a major
label, success via independent labels or user-generated content may not suffice
even if the song has gone viral.79
Obviously, it is hard to generalize the impact of the shift from the album
model to the singles model on professional songwriters. Some songwriters, for
instance, will work better under the singles model, because they are not interested
in writing many songs and have no urgency to move the term forward. Some are
also very talented, and the singles model could be quite beneficial if they manage
to negotiate for a higher rate in exchange for benchmarks that are tied to
commercial success. Meanwhile, other songwriters get used to having a high
volume of production in an effort to move the term and to get additional
advances. Oftentimes, the push for high volume of output has resulted in the
production of a large number of songs with mixed success. Such a push would
therefore work better with the old album model, which bundles one or two
popular songs together with other mediocre--or, worse, filler-tunes."
78 Compare PASSMAN, supra note 32, at 281 ("The advance for a single-song agreement is usually
not very significant. It ranges anywhere from nothing (the most common) to $250 or $500, if we're
talking about unknown songwriters and no unusual circumstances (such as a major artist who's
committed to record the song, which of course changes the whole ball game). Major songwriters
rarely sign single-song agreements other than for films .... ), with id. at 283 ("[N]ew writers
signing to a major publisher might get an advance in the range of $18,000 to $100,000 per year,
and less if you sign to a smaller publisher .... If you are an established writer, the advances ...
can range from $2,000 to several thousand dollars per month, and up. Some superstar writers get
hundreds of thousands of dollars per year.").
7 See id. at 287 ("[I]f you're not [a recording] artist but agreed that a certain number of your songs
must be released on a major label, you could be stuck in the first period, despite giving the
publisher hundreds of unrecorded songs. Or if you're getting songs released digitally only, or
outside the United States only, or on indie labels.").
80 See KNOPPER, supra note 64, at 106 ("By the late 1990s, the record business had boiled down
much of the business to a simple formula: 2 good songs + 10 or 12 mediocre songs = 1 $15 CD,
meaning billions of dollars in overall sales.").
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IV. WHY CAN WE BRING EUROPEAN CDS
BACK TO THE UNITED STATES?
Copyright is territorial by nature.8' There is no unitary protection
throughout the world, and U.S. and Canadian copyright holders often do not have
rights in Europe. While some European rights holders are part of a large United
States-based global conglomerate-Warner Music France being part of Warner
Music Group, for example-the creation of separate companies for tax, business,
and other reasons have resulted in the existence of territorially based rights
holders.
The geographical constraints on the use of copyrighted works are
sometimes counterproductive. Although distribution rights are regionally
exhausted within the European Union, there is no guarantee that legally
purchased music can be portable across state lines. The Union does not have
unitary copyright titles,82  and many different collective management
organizations ("CMOs") exist. 3 As the European Commission lamented in A
Digital Agenda for Europe:
Consumers expect, rightly, that they can access content online at
least as effectively as in the offline world. Europe lacks a
unified market in the content sector. For instance, to set-up a
pan-European service an online music store would have to
negotiate with numerous rights management societies based in
27 [now 28] countries. Consumers can buy CDs in every shop
but are often unable to buy music from online platforms across
the EU because rights are licensed on a national basis. This
contrasts with the relatively simple business environment and
81 See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 5(3), Sept. 9, 1886,
828 U.N.T.S. 221 (revised at Paris July 24, 1971) [hereinafter Berne Convention] ("Protection in
the country of origin is governed by domestic law.").
82 See FREDERICK M. ABBOTT, PARALLEL IMPORTATION: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL WELFARE
DIMENsIONs 5 (2007), available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2007/parallelimportation.pdf ("Under
a 'regional' exhaustion policy, the IP holder's right is extinguished when a good or service is put
onto the market within any country of a defined region, such as the European Union. 'Parallel
imports' are permitted, but only with respect to goods first placed on the market within the regional
territory."); Irene Calboli, Market Integration and (the Limits o) the First Sale Rule in North
American and European Trademark Law, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1241, 1256-58 (2011)
(explaining the differences among national, international, and regional exhaustion); Ryan L.
Vinelli, Note, Bringing down the Walls: How Technology Is Being Used to Thwart Parallel
Importers amid the International Confusion Concerning Exhaustion ofRights, 17 CARDOZO J. INT'L
& COMp. L. 135, 148-51 (2009) (same).
83 For discussions of CMOs, see generally COLLECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF COPYRIGHT AND RELATED
RIGHTS (Daniel J. Gervais ed., 2d ed. 2010) [hereinafter COLLECTIVE MANAGEMENT]; Robert P.
Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights
Organizations, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1293 (1996).
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distribution channels in other regions, notably the US, and
reflects other fragmented markets such as those in Asia ... '
The existence of multiple CMOs, indeed, has led to the creation of
"thickets" and high transaction costs that make it difficult for rights to be
exploited. 5 As William Patry observed:
In order to have a music service offered to the public, all
possible rights holders must sign off. It does no good to get the
right to stream performances of sound recordings unless you
have the right to also stream the underlying musical composition.
Unless you get both rights, you can't offer the service. Given
that you want to offer as wide a service as possible, you have to
obtain licenses from everyone. If a single important licensor
says no, you're sunk. 6
In Canada, for example, the Copyright Board of Canada had to use the
pressure of issuing a single tariff to bring together different CMOs under
"shotgun marriages.""7 In the words of Daniel Gervais:
[T]he Copyright Board of [Canada] has essentially forced CMOs
to work together to offer a single fee license to users who need
multiple right fragments. This allows them to pay a single fee
and it allows the Board to determine the entire value of the
copyright bundle (all of the fragments) needed by the user. The
bundle must then be split for distribution purposes (as the Board
84 A Digital Agenda for Europe, at 7, COM (2010) 245 final (Aug. 26, 2010); see also PATRY, supra
note 3, at 186 ("[Mlany tens of millions of dollars are left on the table in Europe alone because of
the inability to get pan-European licenses. Instead, licensees have to negotiate on a country-by-
country basis with national collecting societies, music publishers, and record labels (to name only
the top three groups), to say nothing of countries where there are no collecting societies. Authors
lose because deals aren't done; the public loses because there is a dearth of authorized, complete
services; copyright law as a system loses for both these reasons.").
85 See McLEOD & DICOLA, supra note 4, at 13 (noting the problems in the area of digital sampling
caused by the legal and bureaucratic pressures of licensing). For excellent discussions of "thickets"
in the intellectual property area in general and biomedical research in particular, see generally
MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY: How Too MUCH OWNERSHIP WRECKS MARKETS,
STOPS INNOVATION, AND COSTS LIVES 49-78 (2010); Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg,
Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 Sci. 698 (1998).
86 PARY, supra note 3, at 185.
87 Mario Bouchard, Collective Management in Commonwealth Jurisdictions: Comparing Canada
with Australia, in COLLECTIVE MANAGEMENT, supra note 83, at 307, 320.
380 [Vol. 83:2
HOW COPYRIGHT LAW MA YAFFECT POP MUSIC
did) between the various CMOs representing different groups of
right holders. But that is of no concern to the user."8
In the past few years, the European Commission introduced efforts to
make it easier for EU nationals to obtain music online. From December 2013 to
March 2014, the Commission held a consultation on the modernization of the EU
copyright regime. A key focus of this consultation was "to increase the cross-
border availability of content services in the Single Market, while ensuring an
adequate level of protection for right holders." 9 This consultation built on the
practical industry-based solutions explored in the recently concluded "Licences
for Europe" Stakeholder Dialogue, which the Commission launched in February
2013.90 To facilitate the cross-border portability of subscription services, the
consultation also explored the need for the development of region-wide unitary
copyright titles.9"
To some extent, the recent EU effort dovetails with the call by Francis
Gurry, the director general of the World Intellectual Property Organization
("WIPO"), for the creation of "a seamless global digital marketplace" during the
2013 WIPO General Assembly.9" As he recently explained in an interview with
the Intellectual Property Watch:
For as long as it is easier to get content illegally than it is to get it
legally, there is an encouragement to piracy. We have to make
the conditions to get it legally better than illegally and that is the
global digital marketplace.
88 Daniel Gervais, Collective Management of Copyright: Theory and Practice in the Digital Age, in
COLLECTIVE MANAGEMENT, supra note 83, at 1, 13.
89 COMM'N EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, PUBLIC CONSULTATION ON THE REVIEW OF THE EU
COPYRIGHT RULES 8 (2013), available at http://ec.europa.eu/intemalmarket/consultations/2013/
copyright-rules/docs/consultation-document en.pdf [hereinafter EU CONSULTATION DOCUMENT].
90 See Licences for Europe: Ten Pledges to Bring More Content Online, EUROPEAN COMMISSION
(Nov. 13, 2013), available at http://ec.europa.eu/intemalmarket/copyright/docs/licences-for-
europe/i 3111 3ten-pledges-en.pdf.
91 As the consultation document stated:
The idea of establishing a unified EU Copyright Title has been present in the
copyright debate for quite some time now, although views as to the merits and
the feasibility of such an objective are divided. A unified EU Copyright Title
would totally harmonise the area of copyright law in the EU and replace
national laws. There would then be a single EU title instead of a bundle of
national rights. Some see this as the only manner in which a truly Single
Market for content protected by copyright can be ensured, while others believe
that the same objective can better be achieved by establishing a higher level of
harmonisation while allowing for a certain degree of flexibility and specificity
in Member States' legal systems.
EU CONSULTATION DOCUMENT, supra note 89, at 36.
92 Francis Gurry, Address by the Director General, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. (Sept. 23, 2013),
http://www.wipo.int/about-wipo/en/dgo/speeches/a5 1dgspeech.html.
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Let me give you [an] example: if one of the HBO series
comes out in a new season in, for example, the US but is not
available in the new season in certain other countries. What do
people do? Do they wait patiently for three months? No,
because they are addicted! So this is where I think our objective
ought be a seamless global legal digital marketplace and I think
everyone has agreed on this.93
Although Gurry did not believe the creation of this new marketplace should be "a
legislative exercise," he noted the need to establish "a multi-stakeholder
dialogue" to facilitate such creation.94
Given the territorial nature of copyright law and the complications raised
by state borders, one has to wonder why U.S. tourists can bring back books, CDs,
computer software, and other copyrighted works from Europe.95 After all,
Section 602(a)(1) of the Copyright Act, which focuses on "infringing importation
or exportation of copies or phonorecords," expressly provides:
Importation into the United States, without the authority of the
owner of copyright under this title, of copies or phonorecords of
a work that have been acquired outside the United States is an
infringement of the exclusive right to distribute copies or
phonorecords under section 106, actionable under section 501.96
Section 602(a)(2) further states:
Importation into the United States ... without the authority of
the owner of copyright under this title, of copies or
phonorecords, the making of which either constituted an
infringement of copyright, or which would have constituted an
infringement of copyright if this title had been applicable, is an
infringement of the exclusive right to distribute copies or
phonorecords under section 106, actionable under sections 501
and 506."7
93 Catherine Saez, WIPO Director Gurry Speaks on Naming New Cabinet, Future of WIPO,
INTELL. PROP. WATCH (May 8, 2014), http://www.ip-watch.org/2014/05/08/wipo-director-gurry-
speaks-on-naming-new-cabinet-future-of-wipo/.94 id.
95 Let's ignore, for now, the potential additional complications from territorially based lockout
codes, which have been widely deployed to protect movies, television shows, music, computer
software, and online games. See Peter K. Yu, Region Codes and the Territorial Mess, 30 CARDozo
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 187, 257 (2012).
96 17 U.S.C. § 602(a)(1) (2012).
97 Id. § 602(a)(2).
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The answer to this question is simple. Section 602(a)(3) contains three
exceptions to these two sections.98 Section 602(a)(3)(B) specifically provides:
[I]mportation ... for the private use of the importer.. . and not
for distribution, by any person with respect to no more than one
copy or phonorecord of any one work at any one time, or by any
person arriving from outside the United States... with respect to
copies or phonorecords forming part of such person's personal
baggage ....
This provision covers what is generally known as the exception for "private use,"
"personal luggage," or "de minimis importation." This exception allows
individuals traveling with goods purchased from abroad to bring these goods
back to the United States even if they have not received authorization from the
relevant copyright holders.
During the negotiation of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement
(ACTA),' ° the potential removal of this exception sparked quite a controversy.
From the standpoint of combating piracy and counterfeiting, such removal is
understandable because many rights holders viewed the exception as an
unnecessary loophole."°' They also feared that the exception would send a wrong
9 d. § 602(a)(3)(A)-(C).
9' Id. § 602(a)(3)(B).
100 Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, opened for signature May 1, 2011, 50 I.L.M. 243 (2011)
[hereinafter ACTA]. ACTA is a plurilateral intellectual property agreement negotiated by the
United States and ten other developed or likeminded countries. For the Author's earlier discussions
of this agreement, see generally Peter K. Yu, ACTA and Its Complex Politics, 3 WIPO J. 1 (2011);
Peter K. Yu, Enforcement, Enforcement, What Enforcement?, 52 IDEA 239 (2012); Peter K. Yu,
Six Secret (and Now Open) Fears of ACTA, 64 SMU L. REv. 975 (2011) [hereinafter Yu, Six Secret
Fears].
101 See TIMOTHY P. TRAINER & VICKI E. ALLUMS, PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
ACROSS BORDERS § 6:50, at 703 (2008) ("Although it might be viewed as draconian, one way to
close a loophole when there is no uniform standard is to eliminate the exemption altogether. The
de minimis exemption is one that, perhaps, should be eliminated and subject all trade in counterfeit
and pirate products to the enforcement measures."). As Timothy Trainer, the former president of
the International AntiCounterfeiting Coalition, declared in his testimony before the U.S.-China
Economic and Security Commission:
[11f we do not wish to impose penalties [on buyers of counterfeit goods],
perhaps we should, at least, eliminate the personal use exemption in the
Customs law and regulations that allow individuals to keep the counterfeit
goods purchased abroad. The Customs law and regulation could be changed to
require the confiscation of any counterfeit product and impose an
administrative fine on persons entering the United States and in personal
possession of any counterfeit or pirated product, including in their luggage.
Timothy Trainer, Testimony Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Commission, Hearing
on Intellectual Property Rights Issues and Dangers of Counterfeited Goods Imported into the
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message that in turn would slow down efforts to combat piracy and
counterfeiting.0 2 In addition, the removal of the personal luggage exception was
supported by those countries that had already prohibited the possession of
counterfeit goods, such as France and Switzerland, or had other similarly
stringent requirements.0 3 If possession of counterfeit goods was illegal, it was
only logical that travelers were disallowed to carry these goods in their personal
luggage.
Nevertheless, many considered the personal luggage exception
commonsensical. In their view, the removal of this exception was onerous,
unnecessary, and draconian. The exception was also consistent with international
standards. Article 60 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights ("TRIPS Agreement") of the World Trade Organization
specifically provides: "Members may exclude from the application of the above
provisions small quantities of goods of a non-commercial nature contained in
travellers 'personal luggage or sent in small consignments."' 0
Moreover, tourists are not in the best position to assess whether proper
authorization has been obtained for intellectual property goods. A seemingly
legitimate product could easily have infringed on the rights of others. The
United States 8-9 (June 8, 2006) [hereinafter Trainer's USSC Testimony], available at
http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/06_06_7_8_trainer-tim.pdf (written testimony of Timothy
Trainer, President, Global Intellectual Property Strategy Center).
102 See Michael Geist, Canada's ACTA Briefing, Part Five: The Fight Over a De Minimis
Exception, MICHAEL GEIST'S BLOG (Apr. 6, 2009), http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/3834/
125/ ("[S]ome groups [are] concerned that it would send a signal that purchasing counterfeit
products for personal use is acceptable or that it could lead to the importation of counterfeit
medicines."); Global Organizations Provide Governments with Recommendations on Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, Bus. ACTION TO STOP COUNTERFEITING & PIRACY (June 25,
2010), http://www.iccwbo.org/News/Articles/2010/Global-organizations-provide-governments-
with-recommendations-on-anti-conterfeiting-trade-agreement/ (stating in the joint
recommendations and comments on ACTA submitted by Business Action to Stop Counterfeiting
and Piracy and the International Trademark Association the belief that "making an explicit
exception that permits travelers to bring in goods for personal use sends a wrong message to
consumers that buying counterfeits is accepted by the government").
103 See Trainer's USSC Testimony, supra note 101, at 8 ("France and Italy have been extremely
aggressive in imposing fines on consumers of counterfeit merchandise."); see also TRAINER &
ALLUMS, supra note 101, § 6:50, at 703 ("Because of the growing trade in counterfeit and pirate
products, there are some governments, notably France, that have decided to take stringent measures
by targeting tourists who may have only one counterfeit item. Switzerland appears to be following
France's example." (footnote omitted)).
104 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 60, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299
(1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement] (emphasis added); see also Council Regulation 1383/2003,
of 22 July 2003 Concerning Customs Action Against Goods Suspected of Infringing Certain
Intellectual Property Rights and the Measures to Be Taken Against Goods Found to Have Infiinged
Such Rights, art. 3(2), 2003 O.J. (L 196) 7 ("Where a traveller's personal baggage contains goods
of a non-commercial nature within the limits of the duty-free allowance and there are no material
indications to suggest the goods are part of commercial traffic, Member States shall consider such
goods to be outside the scope of this Regulation.").
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removal of the personal luggage exception might also have appeared worse than
it seemed when such removal was viewed against a background of highly
secretive, unaccountable, and undemocratic negotiations.'° Given the highly
unappealing nature of the ACTA negotiations, it is no surprise that many inferred
from these negotiations that something shady had been going on. As Cory
Doctorow declared, tongue in cheek, "What's in ACTA? Well, it kind of doesn't
matter. If it were good stuff, they'd be negotiating it in public where we could all
see it."'0 6
In the end, because of the wide public protests against ACTA, the
removal of the personal luggage exception was made only optional, similar to the
TRIPS Agreement. °7 Although it may never be publicly known whether the
optional exception was retained as a compromise-and if so, how this
compromise was reached--countries were expressly allowed to retain the
personal luggage exception under the joint consolidated draft, which was
released after the eighth round of negotiations in Wellington, New Zealand.0 8
The final text of ACTA, which was adopted on April 15, 2013, also retains this
optional requirement. Article 14(2) of ACTA now provides: "A Party may
exclude from the application of this Section small quantities of goods of a non-
commercial nature contained in travellers' personal luggage."'0 9
V. WHY CAN'T YOUTUBE VIDEOS BE CREATED
WITH ASCAP/BMI LICENSES?
Although YouTube videos consist of mostly audiovisual content, they
have created a unique challenge for the protection of copyrighted music
compositions and sound recordings. This challenge was indeed the reason why
the National Music Publishers' Association and other music publishers jointly
105 For discussions of the lack of transparency in the ACTA negotiations, see generally David S.
Levine, Bring in the Nerds: Secrecy, National Security and the Creation of International
Intellectual Property Law, 30 CARDozo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 105 (2012); David S. Levine,
Transparency Soup: The ACTA Negotiating Process and "Black Box" Lawmaking, 26 AM. U.
INT'L L. REv. 811 (2011); Yu, Six Secret Fears, supra note 100, at 998-1019.
106 Cory Doctorow, Big Entertainment Wants to Party Like It's 1996, INTERNET REVOLUTION (Apr.
21, 2009), quoted in Yu, Six Secret Fears, supra note 100, at 976.
107 See Yu, Six Secret Fears, supra note 100, at 1000 ("To alleviate [public] concern, ACTA
negotiators . . .quickly reached a consensus on the de minimis provision, notwithstanding the
negotiating parties' initial disagreement over the scope of such a provision, as well as some
lingering concerns from selected industry groups-most notably INTA and the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce" (footnote omitted)).
108 See Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement art. 2X, opened for signature May 1, 2011 (Apr. 2010
draft), available at http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/1883 ("Parties may exclude from the
application of this Section small quantities of goods of a non-commercial nature contained in
travelers' personal luggage [or sent in small consignments.]").
109ACTA, supra note 100, art. 14(2).
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filed a putative class action lawsuit against YouTube for copyright infringement
in Football Association Premier League Ltd. v. YouTube, Inc."'
For recorded popular music, there are usually two different layers of
copyright: one for the sound recording and the other for the underlying musical
composition, which includes both the musical notes and the lyrics.'1 While the
former was not protected until the passage of the Sound Recording Act of
1971,112 which entered into effect on February 15, 1972, the latter has been
protected for almost two centuries since the 1831 Copyright Act."3 Because the
1976 Copyright Act allows for the divisibility of copyright,"4 copyright holders
can freely transfer their reproduction, adaptation, distribution, public display,
public performance, and digital audio transmission rights."' Section 201(d)(2)
specifically states:
Any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, including
any subdivision of any of the rights specified by section 106,
may be transferred ... and owned separately. The owner of any
particular exclusive right is entitled, to the extent of that right, to
all of the protection and remedies accorded to the copyright
owner by this title."6
11o Football Association Premier League Ltd. v. YouTube, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 2d 159 (S.D.N.Y.
2009).
"'. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2), (7) (2012) (separating "musical works, including any accompanying
words" from "sound recordings" in the categories of copyrightable subject matter); see also
Newton v. Diamond, 349 F.3d 591, 592-93 (9th Cir. 2003) ("Sound recordings and their
underlying compositions are separate works with their own distinct copyrights.").
112 Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (1971).
113 Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436.
114 See generally STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., STUDY No. 11: DIvIsIBILITY
OF COPYRIGHTS (Comm. Print 1960) (study by Abraham L. Kaminstein) (providing an excellent
study on the divisibility of copyright). As Abraham Kaminstein, a future Register of Copyrights,
explained:
When copyright consisted solely in the right to multiply copies, transfers were
generally of the entire copyright; as long as the rights and the uses of copyright
material remained few, the problems incident to transferring one of a bundle of
rights were of little consequence. The present difficulty arises from the fact
that a theory enunciated during the period of a limited number of rights and
uses of copyright material has been applied to the great proliferation of rights
and uses which have developed since the turn of the century. The concept of
indivisibility tends to force all sales or transfers of copyrights or rights in
copyrights into one of two molds, (a) assignment, a complete transfer of all
rights, or (b) license, a transfer of any portion of those rights. An assignment
carries all rights; a license is really a contract not to sue the licensee, and the
licensee cannot fully enforce his rights against third parties.
Id. at 1.
"' 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012) (stipulating these rights).
116 Id. § 201(d)(2).
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The ability to transfer these various exclusive rights has therefore made
monitoring and collection of royalties especially cumbersome and time-
consuming. The need for monitoring and royalty collection, in turn, necessitates
the assistance of CMOs.
As far as music in the U.S. market is concerned, there are three different
groups of CMOs, each handling different types of rights and beneficiaries. The
Harry Fox Agency, a wholly owned subsidiary of the National Music Publishers'
Association, handles the wide majority of mechanical and synchronization
licenses on behalf of music publishers."7 Meanwhile, ASCAP, BMI, and the
Society of European Stage Authors and Composers (SESAC) collect public
performance royalties for publishers and songwriters. Out of these three
performing rights organizations, ASCAP is "the oldest and by far the largest in
terms of billings," while BMI is the largest when "measured by [the] number of
'affiliates."'"' I Together, they "collect over 95% of all U.S. performance
royalties, with [SESAC] receiving the remainder."" 9 Finally, SoundExchange
was created in the early 2000s to collect digital performance royalties on behalf
of recording artists and record labels. 20 Among the royalties collected were
those originating from "Pandora, SiriusXM, webcasters and cable TV music
channels.''
l
The origin of ASCAP as a CMO began with the frustration a group of
songwriters had over their inability to collect royalties for the performance of
their music compositions. 22 Such frustration eventually led to the formation of
ASCAP in 1914,123 which was quickly followed by the now-famous United States
Supreme Court case of Herbert v. Shanley.124 In this case, the Court determined
whether the performance of a copyrighted musical work in a restaurant or hotel
without admission charges infringed on the right to perform publicly for profit.
Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes declared:
If the rights under the copyright are infringed only by a
performance where money is taken at the door, they are very
imperfectly protected. Performances not different in kind from
those of the defendants could be given that might compete with
117 See HAROLD L. VOGEL, ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY ECONOMICS: A GUIDE FOR FINANcIAL
ANALYSIS 255 (8th ed. 2011).
"'Id. at 254.
U9 Id.
120 See Peter DiCola & Matthew Sag, An Information-Gathering Approach to Copyright Policy, 34
CARDOZO L. REV. 173, 230 (2012).
121 About Digital Royalties, SOUNDEXCHANGE, http://www.soundexchange.com/artist-copyright-
owner/digital-royalties/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2014).
122 See KOHN & KOHN, supra note 32, at 1247-48. Among this group were Irving Berlin, Gene
Buck, Nathan Burkan, Victor Herbert, John Philip Sousa, and Jay Witmark. Id. at 1248.
123 See id. at 1249.
124 Herbert v. Shanley, 242 U.S. 591 (1917).
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and even destroy the success of the monopoly that the law
intends the plaintiffs to have. It is enough to say that there is no
need to construe the statute so narrowly. The defendants'
performances are not eleemosynary. They are part of a total for
which the public pays, and the fact that the price of the whole is
attributed to a particular item which those present are expected to
order is not important. It is true that the music is not the sole
object, but neither is the food, which probably could be got
cheaper elsewhere. The object is a repast in surroundings that to
people having limited powers of conversation or disliking the
rival noise, give a luxurious pleasure not to be had from eating a
silent meal. If music did not pay, it would be given up. If it
pays, it pays out of the public's pocket. Whether it pays or not,
the purpose of employing it is profit, and that is enough. 125
As a result, restaurants, hotels, and other similar businesses that performed music
in public (such as concert halls, dance halls, theaters, cabarets, and night clubs)
had to pay performance royalties to copyright holders even when they did not
charge admission fees for the performances.'26
In the late 1930s, backed by court decisions that deemed broadcasting a
"for-profit" public performance, ASCAP became more aggressive, raising its
fees repeatedly and substantially. As David Bollier recounted:
At the time, ASCAP required artists to have five hits before it
would serve as a collection agency for them, a rule that
privileged the playing of pop music on the radio at the expense
of rhythm and blues, jazz, hillbilly, and ethnic music. Then, over
the course of eight years, ASCAP raised its rates by 450 percent
between 1931 and 1939-at which point, ASCAP then proposed
doubling its rates for 1940.27
In protest to these ever-increasing fees, many radio stations boycotted
ASCAP and turned to Latin music as well as musical works that did not belong
to ASCAP members.128 In addition, they formed BMI as their own CMO. 1'29 This
125 Id. at 594-95.
126 See KOHN & KOHN, supra note 32, at 1249.
127 DAVID BOLLIER, VIRAL SPIRAL: How THE COMMONERS BUILT A DIGITAL REPUBLIC OF THEIR
OWN 156 (2008).
128 See JULIE E. COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY 455 (3d ed. 2010)
("[O]n January 1, 1941, radio stations began a boycott of ASCAP music, instead broadcasting
almost exclusively Latin music, which ASCAP had thus far ignored."); K.J. Greene, "Copynorms, "
Black Cultural Production, and the Debate Over African-American Reparations, 25 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1179 (2008) (noting that black artists were excluded from ASCAP).
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new organization "sought to break the ASCAP monopoly by offering free
arrangements of public-domain music to radio stations. [It] also charged lower
rates than ASCAP for licensing music and offered better contracts for artists."'3 °
Although ASCAP and BMI had greatly reduced the transaction costs
incurred by obtaining licenses to perform songs in the covered repertoire,
concerns arose over their potential to abuse their dominant position-for
example, when they pooled together thousands of copyrighted musical works and
offered blanket licenses on an all-or-nothing basis.' As Glynn Lunney
observed:
In the United States, these CMOs are viewed as something of a
necessary evil. By reducing the transaction costs entailed in
enforcing and licensing the public performance of musical
works, they create a market in which otherwise there would be
only infringement. But they do not merely reduce the
transaction costs associated with the public performance right,
they also eliminate competition between the individual copyright
owners over public performance licensing terms and pricing.
Because of this anti-competitive potential, copyright collectives
in the United States have faced recurring litigation over whether
their licensing practices violate the anti-trust laws.'32
Following antitrust litigation launched by the United States Department
of Justice in the early 1930s and then the 1940s, both ASCAP and BMI now
abide by consent decrees. 33  Under these decrees and their subsequent
amendments,'34 "a potential licensee may apply to a federal court for a binding
129 See KOIN & KOHN, supra note 32, at 1250 ("[Iln anticipation of a breakdown in negotiations
with ASCAP over the rates to be charged for the following year, a group of broadcasters, including
the major radio networks and nearly 500 independent radio stations, established an organization
called Broadcast Music Incorporated ... .
130 BOLLIER, supra note 127, at 156.
131 See Loren, supra note 32, at 685 ("The practice of pooling thousands of copyrighted musical
works and then offering blanket licenses did not go unnoticed by the Antitrust Division of the U.S.
Justice Department.").
132 Glynn Lunney, Copyright Collectives and Collecting Societies: The United States Experience, in
COLLECTIVE MANAGEMENT, supra note 83, at 339, 340.
133 As Professor Lunney recounted:
The first such lawsuit was initiated by the Department of Justice in the early
1930s. In the lawsuit, the Department of Justice alleged that ASCAP was an
unlawful combination, in the vein of Standard Oil. In the 1940s, the
Department of Justice initiated a second set of lawsuits against both BMI and
ASCAP, alleging that the collectives' licensing practices unreasonably
restrained trade. The parties settled the litigation in 1941 and entered into
consent decrees that have governed the licensing practices of ASCAP and BMI
ever since.
Id. at 340 (footnote omitted).
134 As Professor Lunney elaborated:
2014]
UMKC LAW REVIEW
determination of 'reasonable' fees in the event that the licensee and the CMO
cannot come to an agreement on the fee to be paid."'135
Since the mid-1990s, the growing popularity of the internet has led to
further complications with respect to copyrighted works disseminated over the
internet. In addition to challenges concerning copyright enforcement in the
digital environment, dissemination over this new medium has implicated many
different rights protected under Section 106 of the 1976 Copyright Act. Thus,
while ASCAP, BMI, or SESAC may own the performance right, the right to
make mechanical reproductions may belong to record labels or the Harry Fox
Agency. The new medium of the internet has also generated considerable
uncertainty over the act of making content available. Does this act involve the
distribution right, the performance right, the right of communication to the public
as protected by the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
Works (of which the United States is a member),'36 or the right of making
available as recognized in the 1996 WIPO Internet Treaties (of which the United
States is also a member)? 37
Even more troubling, many of these rights overlap with each other,
making their control highly uncertain in the new digital environment. As Mark
Lemley observed in relation to overlapping rights in the early days of the World
Wide Web:
Consider the licensing of rights to musical works. ASCAP
controls and licenses the right to publicly perform most musical
compositions, while a different group (the publishers or record
labels) generally controls the right to reproduce such works.
These groups will likely fight vigorously over who has the right
to license the network transmission of musical compositions (and
to receive revenue from that transmission). The answer cannot
be found in the license agreement, nor is it likely to be found in
some presumed "intent" of the parties. The question will have to
be answered as a policy matter, by courts or by Congress. 38
Over the years, the terms of the consent decrees have been adjusted to reflect
the developments of new technologies and new markets. Yet, although their
precise terms have varied over time, their thrust has remained consistent. In
essence, the consent decrees validate the essential role of the collectives in
creating a workable market in the public performance right, and then attempt to
regulate their pricing and licensing terms in order to limit the collective's anti-
competitive potential.
Id. at 340-41.
135 Loren, supra note 32, at 685.
136 Berne Conveinion, supra note 81, arts. 11, 1 ibis, lIter, 14.
117 WIPO Copyright Treaty arts. 6, 8, Dec. 20, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17, at 1 (1997); WIPO
Performances and Phonograms Treaty arts. 8, 10, 12, 14, Dec. 20, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17,
at 18 (1997).
138 Mark A. Lemley, Dealing with Overlapping Copyrights on the Internet, 22 U. DAYTON L. REv.
547, 574 (1997); see also Gervais, supra note 88, at 10 ("Right fragments such as 'reproduction' or
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Part of the reason why overlapping rights have presented such a major
challenge is the tendency for rights holders to view the use of copyrighted works
through their own lens (not to mention the significant mismatch between
historically developed rights and new production, distribution, and consumption
models). As Donald Passman observed:
If you're a performing rights society, everything looks like a
performance. If you're the Harry Fox Agency, which collects
mechanicals, everything looks like a mechanical. For instance, if
you stream a song on demand, ASCAP argues that it's a
performance, just like hearing the song on a radio. No one really
disputes that. However, Fox thinks it's also a mechanical use,
which is a much trickier question. They say you need a license
to reproduce the song on the server of the company doing the
streaming, and that your personal computer has to make a copy
in its cache for you to hear it, both of which are true. Since the
right to duplicate a copyrighted work is separate from the
performance right, they argue that you need a license from
them.139
Also complicating the digital licensing arrangement are the divergent
business models behind the licensing of musical works. Consider the different
approaches taken by music publishers and record labels. As Patrik Wikstr6m
observed more than five years ago:
Music licensing has always been an integral and lucrative part of
the music business, but it has often created a tension in the
relationship between music publishers and record labels.
Although music is the essential factor to both of them, their aims
and their business models differ. To the music publisher or the
'public performance' are complex and increasingly a source of frustration for users because they no
longer map out discrete uses, especially on the Intemet. Put differently, a single use of a copyright
work or object of a related right (e.g. performance, recording) often requires multiple authorizations
(right fragments) from several different rights holders. The way in which right fragments are
expressed no longer matches who does what, and for what 'purpose, with a work or object of a
related right.").
139 PASSMAN, supra note 32, at 253; see also Reforming Section 115 of the Copyright Act for the
Digital Age: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Marybeth Peters, U.S.
Register of Copyrights), available at http://www.copyright.gov/docs/regstat032207-1.html
("[L]icensors have rarely turned down the opportunity in the digital age to seek royalties, even
when the basis for their requests is weak at best. Online music companies rightly complain that
they need certainty over what rights are implicated and what royalties are payable so that they can
operate without fear of being sued for copyright infringement.").
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licensing department of a full-service music firm, licensing
opportunities . . . are the bread and butter of their business.
There is simply no other kind of income besides the royalties
paid by the licensees. From the record labels' point of view, the
licensing has a completely different purpose, and that purpose is
to promote an act. The licensing fee paid by the licensee is only
the icing on the cake, since the record label's core business is the
selling of audio recordings (primarily CDs) to consumers. In a
competition to have a song included in a film etc., the record
label might be inclined to waive the fee in order to win the
competition and achieve the much desired presence. 4 °
Although music publishers and record labels used to have wider
differences in their approaches, the significant reduction of music sales in recent
years has led the latter to pay greater attention to licensing revenue. As Donald
Passman observed: "Nowadays, all of the major record companies have what's
called a special markets or catalog division, whose job is to take existing
recordings and come up with ways to squeeze money out of them."14' Moreover,
as music fans migrate from physical albums to digital singles and now to licensed
performances via Pandora, Spotify, and other online streaming services, the
differences between the two groups have considerably narrowed.
As if these complications were not challenging enough, no U.S. CMO
has thus far been established to grant synchronization licenses to audiovisual
contents, such as MTV or YouTube videos.'42 Synchronization licenses, or
"synch licenses" for short, are similar to performance licenses except for their
tailoring to the specific use of the relevant copyrighted content-for example, in
motion pictures, television programs, commercials, or video games.' Thus,
although individual users do not always time the visual images to the licensed
music,'" the "synchronization" label notwithstanding, it is understood that a
synchronization license granted for Video A may not be used for Video B.
Given the lack of preexisting synchronization licensing arrangements-
compulsory or otherwise-copyright holders of audiovisual works are free to
140 WIKSTR'M, supra note 54, at 97.
141 PASSMAN, supra note 32, at 138.
142 See id. at 259 ("[Tlhere's no central place for the YouTubes of the world to make a deal for all
their music (Fox doesn't represent all the publishers). It also means the publishers who don't use
Fox have to do tons of licenses for tiny money."); see also id. at 326 ("There's no compulsory
license for video streaming, whether it's interactive or not. So the companies can charge whatever
they can extort.").
14 See id. at 248-53 (discussing synchronization and transcription licenses).
144 See KoHN- & KOHN, supra note 32, at 368 ("Technically, the music is not always 'synchronized'
or recorded, as some licenses say, 'in timed-relation with' the motion picture, but these terms
convey the notion that the permission to make reproductions of the music is strictly limited to
copies embodying the specified motion picture together with the music.").
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negotiate their own licenses. Such freedom, in turn, has greatly increased the
transaction costs incurred in securing these licenses. As the need for
performance and synchronization licenses in the digital environment continues to
grow, "'45 transaction costs are likely to substantially increase.
In the early 2010s, after years of copyright litigation, YouTube (and
Google) finally reached agreements with music publishers and record labels.'46
Although these agreements vary, the agreement between YouTube and the Harry
Fox Agency, which is publicly available, provided an instructive example of how
YouTube's advertising revenue is to be divvied up:
a. If it's a user-created video that includes a commercial
recording of the song (remember, this doesn't include record
company-created videos, where the record company pays the
publisher), the video streaming service pays the publisher 15%
of net ad revenues.
b. If it's a new recording of the song . , the publisher gets
50% of net ad revenues. But if the uploader gets some of the ad
revenue . . . , YouTube deducts whatever it pays [the uploader]
from the publisher's 50%. However, this deduction is subject to
a limit of 15%, meaning the publisher never gets less than 35%
of net ad revenue.
47
Notwithstanding the licenses YouTube negotiated with both music
publishers and record labels, it remains unclear whether these licenses would
allow individual users to create so-called "user-generated content," such as
remixes, mash-ups, cut-ups, spoofs, parodies, satires, caricatures, pastiches, and
machinimas. This ambiguity was indeed the reason why internet user groups
have actively pushed for the adoption of exceptions for non-commercial user-
generated content,4 1 such as Section 29.21 of the recently adopted Canadian
Copyright Modernization Act.
149
145 See WIKSTR6M, supra note 54, at 93 ("While mechanical royalties have diminished along with
the physical sales of recorded music, both performance and synchronization royalties have
increased since the turn of the millennium."); Brustein, supra note 63 ("[In 2003], digital music
downloads decreased for the first time, with sales of digital tracks falling 5.7 percent. Streaming
consumption increased 32 percent, to 118 billion songs,.... according to Nielsen.").
146 The agreement the National Music Publishers' Association and the Harry Fox Agency reached
with YouTube is available at http://youtubelicensingoffer.biz/.
147 PASSMAN, supra note 32, at 259-60.
148 For the Author's discussions of the exception for non-commercial user-generated content, see
generally Peter K. Yu, Can the Canadian UGC Exception Be Transplanted Abroad?, 26 INTELL.
PROP. J. 177 (2014); Peter K. Yu, The Confuzzling Rhetoric Against New Copyright Exceptions, 1
KRITIKA (forthcoming 2015).
149 Copyright Modernization Act, S.C. 2012, c. 20, § 29.21 (Can.).
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VI. ARE DIGITAL DOWNLOADS SALES OR LICENSES?
The "sale versus license" debate has been ongoing since copyright issues
involving computer software began to attract legislative and policy attention. 5°
There is also a raging debate about the scope and limits of the first sale doctrine
in the digital environment. 5 ' Codifying this doctrine, Section 109(a) of the 1976
Copyright Act provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3), the owner of a
particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or
any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the
authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of
the possession of that copy or phonorecord.'52
Although the first sale doctrine is available to all copyrighted works, it does not
apply if the content is disseminated under a license, as opposed to sold as a good.
As a result, we can lend books to friends or sell them on eBay (books, not
friends), but we may not be allowed to sell computer software online.
The same issue arises with respect to iTunes tracks. The question of
"whether a digital music file, lawfully made and purchased, may be resold by its
owner ... under the first sale doctrine" was recently addressed in Capitol
Records, LLC v. Redigi Inc."3 In this case, a record label sued Redigi Inc. for
copyright infringement based on its provision of a virtual marketplace for
internet users to sell pre-owned iTunes tracks. As the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York declared:
[T]he first sale doctrine does not protect ReDigi's distribution of
Capitol's copyrighted works. This is because, as an unlawful
reproduction, a digital music file sold on ReDigi is not "lawfully made
under this title." Moreover, the statute protects only distribution by
"the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord ... of that copy or
phonorecord." Here, a ReDigi user owns the phonorecord that was
created when she purchased and downloaded a song from iTunes to her
150 See Joseph P. Liu, Owning Digital Copies: Copyright Law and the Incidents of Copy
Ownership, 42 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1245, 1290 (2001) ("Several federal courts have held that the
first sale doctrine does not apply to software users who have licensed the software, because they
have not acquired title to a particular copy.").
151 For discussions of the first sale doctrine in the digital context, see generally U.S. COPYRIGHT
OFFICE, DMCA SECTION 104 REPORT 78-105 (2001); Liu, supra note 150; Aaron Perzanowski &
Jason Schultz, Digital Exhaustion, 58 UCLA L. REv. 889 (2011); Aaron Perzanowski & Jason
Schultz, Legislating Digital Exhaustion, 28 Berkeley Tech. L.J. (forthcoming 2015); R. Anthony
Reese, The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks, 44 B.C. L. REv. 577 (2003).
152 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2012).
153 Capitol Records, LLC v. Redigi Inc, 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 648 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
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hard disk. But to sell that song on ReDigi, she must produce a new
phonorecord on the ReDigi server. Because it is therefore impossible
for the user to sell her "particular" phonorecord on ReDigi, the first sale
statute cannot provide a defense.154
Apart from Redigi, there is the now-famous discussion about whether
Bruce Willis should be able to leave the tracks he lawfully purchased to his
children.'55 Whether he can do so based on the first sale doctrine will depend on
whether digital downloads constitute sales or licenses. The doctrine will apply if
the downloads are goods sold, but will not if they are mere licensed contents. If
the doctrine does not apply, whether Willis can transfer ownership will depend
on the terms of the iTunes license, which currently does not allow for such a
transfer.
Disturbingly, as much as record labels want to consider iTunes tracks
licensed contents in the context of the first sale doctrine, they refuse to do so in
the context of royalty calculation. Under most recording contracts, artists will
get only a small percentage of the sales as royalties-usually ten to twenty
percent.156 By contrast, these same artists will get a much higher percentage of
the licensing revenue-usually under a fifty-fifty split. 57 This different treatment
of sales and licensing revenue makes sense, considering that the licensing
arrangement does not require record labels to make further investments (although
these labels have noted the various expenses incurred in online distribution"'8).
Thus, if revenues from iTunes tracks are considered license fees, as opposed to
sales, record labels will have to provide artists with a substantially larger sum of
royalties. As William Patry pointed out:
154 Id. at 655 (citations omitted).
155 See Brandon Griggs, Can Bruce Willis Leave His iTunes Music to His Kids?, CNN (Sept. 4,
2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/09/03/techweb/bruce-willis-itunes.
156 As Harold Vogel observed in regard to royalty rates for recording artists:
Rates for new artists signed to independent companies might range from 9% to
13% of [the suggested retail price], while rates for new artists signing with a
major label might be 13% to 14%, and rates for superstars 18% to 20%. Yet
for Internet downloads, such rates will often be 20% to 50% less.
VOGEL, supra note 117, at 264.
157 See PASSMAN, supra note 32, at 138 ("Historically, when masters were licensed by a record
company for motion pictures, television shows, and commercials, the company credited the artist's
account with 50% of the company's net receipts.. .
158 As Donald Passman explained:
[In addition to the usual mechanicals and union charges, record labels] argue that they
have expenses for digitizing product, adding metadata..., storing digital files, setting up
SKUs [Shop Keeping Units] for each title [which keep track of who gets paid] ... as well
as monitoring the sales and licensing of millions of micro-transactions. In addition, they
need to allocate some portion of the cost of their staff that does marketing, sales, etc.
Id. at 146.
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It has been estimated.., that artists might receive $2.15 billion
if they are successful in their current disputes with record labels
over whether to categorize the deals with iTunes as involving a
license (where 50 percent royalties are typically paid) rather than
as a sale of copies (where royalties of 10-15 percent are
typically paid).'59
How digital downloads should be treated was under heavy dispute in the
early days of iTunes. A leading case in this area is F.B.T. Productions, LLC v.
Aftermath Records.6° At issue was whether the permanent digital downloads and
mastertones161 of songs performed by the chart-topping rap artist Eminem
constituted records sold or master licenses. The royalty rate was twelve to
twenty percent for the former, but fifty percent for the latter. 161 While the United
States District Court for the Central District of California found for the record
label, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the case.
As Judge Barry Silverman declared:
It is easily gleaned from these sources of federal copyright law
that a license is an authorization by the copyright owner to
enable another party to engage in behavior that would otherwise
be the exclusive right of the copyright owner, but without
transferring title in those rights. This permission can be granted
for the copyright itself, for the physical media containing the
copyrighted work, or for both the copyright and the physical
media.
When the facts of this case are viewed through the lens
of federal copyright law, it is all the more clear that Aftermath's
agreements with the third-party download vendors are "licenses"
to use the Eminem master recordings for specific purposes
authorized thereby-i.e., to create and distribute permanent
downloads and mastertones-in exchange for periodic payments
based on the volume of downloads, without any transfer in title
of Aftermath's copyrights to the recordings. Thus, federal
copyright law supports and reinforces our conclusion that
Aftermath's agreements permitting third parties to use its sound
159 PATRY, supra note 3, at 8.
160 F.B.T. Prods., LLC v. Aftermath Records, 621 F.3d 958 (9th Cir. 2010).
161 Mastertones are ring tones or ring-back tones involving master recordings.
162 Id. at 961; see also Eriq Gardner, Leaked Audit in Eminem Royalty Suit Highlights Huge Stakes
for Record Industry, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Feb. 22, 2012), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-
esq/eminem-royalty-lawsuit-aftermath-records-fbt-productions-293881 (suggesting that "the
plaintiffs believe that the difference in treating digital music as a 'sale' instead of a 'license' during
[the period between July 1, 2005 and December 31, 2009] is worth $3,810,256").
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recordings to produce and sell permanent downloads and
mastertones are licenses.'63
Although the Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the lower court, and a new trial
was set to assess proper damages, the dispute was eventually settled."6
F.B. T. Productions generated a lot of attention and sparked additional
individual and class action lawsuits.'65 Nevertheless, Donald Passman noted that
the case involved a short-form contract and therefore might have been an
outlier.'66 In most other-usually lengthier-contracts, the terms are spelled out
in greater detail even though some gray areas may invariably exist. More
importantly, record labels have since managed to renegotiate most of their
recording contracts-through new contracts, settlement, or otherwise.'67
According to Passman, the current royalty arrangement for digital download is as
follows:
For iTunes-type permanent downloads, the record companies get
what they call a "wholesale price" of 70% of the retail price,
meaning they get around 70¢ for a 99¢ download. In the case of
downloads, the record companies get the money for both
themselves and the songwriters [or publishers], then turn around
and pay [them].'68
163 F.B.T. Prods., 621 F.3d at 965-66.
164 See Eriq Gardner, UMG Reaches Settlement in Trendsetting Suit Over Digital Revenue from
Eminem Songs, HOLLYWOOD REp. (Oct. 30, 2012), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-
esq/umg-reaches-settlement-trendsetting-lawsuit-3 84381 (reporting the settlement).
165 As observed in the Hollywood Reporter:
Other musicians continue to fight to apply the 9th Circuit ruling on "licenses"
to their own contracts. Class actions from the likes of The Temptations and
Rob Zombie are still being litigated. Other artists such as REO Speedwagon,
Kenny Rogers, Sister Sledge, James Taylor and on and on have brought a
barrage of lawsuits on this front. Some entities in the music business such as
Sony Music have made class action settlements.
Id.
166 See PASSMAN, supra note 32, at 145.
167 As Donald Passman observed:
[M]ost of the bigger artists have renegotiated their deals in the last five to ten
years, and when that happened, the companies stuck in clauses that specified
what they got for digital exploitations, regardless of whether it was a sale, a
license, or a homed toad. . . . [E]ven if the artist didn't renegotiate, the
successful artists have audited their record companies .... When the artists
settled these audits . . . , most companies fixed the digital royalty rate from the
end of the audit period into the future. And even if they didn't do that, they
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VII. BONUS QUESTION: WHY DOES THE ROYALTY RATE FOR
SHEET MUSIC STAY AT 7¢ PER COPY?
One surprising development (or its lack thereof) in music law concerns
the royalty rate for sheet music, which stays at 7¢ per copy69 and only reaches
10-120 per copy for a very rare minority. 170  Interestingly for us-and
disappointingly for songwriters-this rate did not increase with inflation. While
one was able to buy something with 7¢ in the early days of rock 'n roll, one
certainly cannot buy much today with the same amount. Even the statutory rate
for mechanical reproductions has been increased from 2¢ per mechanical copy in
1978 to 9.1 ¢ or more today, thanks to the periodic adjustments by the Copyright
Arbitration Royalty Board and now the Copyright Royalty Board.171
The answer to this bonus question has to do with what have been termed
"most favored nation" ("MFN") clauses.'72 Similar to their counterparts in
international agreements, 73  these clauses allow beneficiaries to obtain
preferential treatments that have been granted to third parties in other
agreements. As a result of these MFN clauses, an increase in royalty rate for one
songwriter will have to be immediately and unconditionally extended to all other
songwriters whose contracts include an MFN clause-an extension that is highly
costly and, for some publishers, unaffordable. The rate for sheet music has
169 An example of this clause is as follows:
Seven cents ($.07) per copy for each copy of sheet music in standard piano-
vocal notation of the Composition printed, published and sold in the United
States and Canada by Publisher or its affiliates, for which payment has been
received by Publisher, or been finally credited to Publisher's account in
reduction of an advance after deduction of reasonable returns. (Wherever the
terms "paid," "received," or the equivalent appear in this agreement, they shall
be deemed to include such final credit.)
KOHN & KOHN, supra note 32, at 113.
170 See PASSMAN, supra note 32, at 278 ("Historically, sheet music royalties have hovered in the
range of 7¢ per copy. Occasionally some superstars got as high as 10€ to 12¢ .... "); see also
KOHN & KoHN, supra note 32, at 114 ("Only writers with a high degree of bargaining leverage
should expect to negotiate more than 10 or 12 cents per copy, but not much more.").
' See 17 U.S.C. §§ 801-805 (2012) (providing for the proceedings of the Copyright Royalty
Board); see also Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-419,
118 Stat. 2341 (replacing Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panels with the Copyright Royalty Board).
172 See PASSMAN, supra note 32, at 278 (attributing the practice to "favored nations (meaning a
contract that says its rate goes up if anyone ever gets more) [music publishers have] with a number
of old writers" and noting that "raising the pennies for the new guys would cost them a fortune on
the older deals").
173 See TRIPS Agreement art. 4 ("With regard to the protection of intellectual property, any
advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by a Member to the nationals of any other
country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the nationals of all other
Members.").
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therefore remained more or less the same despite inflation, new uses, and new
markets.
The discussion of MFN clauses in music contracts is particularly timely.
Only recently, independent labels complained about how they had been forced
into accepting the same deals YouTube offered to major record labels. In their
view, such an arrangement had generated the opposite of MFN treatments-
"least favored nation" (LFN) treatments, perhaps.'74 Of particular concern was a
clause that gave Google the right to reduce the rates for independent labels when
any major record label or publisher agreed to a lower rate.'75
To some extent, LFN treatments for indie labels make sense in the
current market. Given the significantly greater leverage the majors have vis-a-vis
YouTube, what bargaining advantage would independent, and often weaker,
labels have if the majors could not even negotiate for a higher rate?
Nevertheless, the contracts negotiated by the majors may not fully reflect their
bargaining power. With a large number of works in play, and therefore
substantial revenue at stake, the majors may be more reluctant than the indies to
drag out the negotiation process or become holdouts in the negotiations.
Moreover, if the current rate is unfavorable, the majors will be powerful enough
to renegotiate this rate in the near future. Thus, unlike the rate for the indies, the
lower rate given to the majors would result in only a short-term loss that may be
offset by later gains. The same unfortunately may not be said of the indies.
Admittedly, this bonus question is somewhat obscure, considering that
sheet music is not as important in the commercial market as it used to be
(although the demand for sheet music in the digital environment seems to have
rejuvenated recently).'76 The question is also somewhat outdated as many
publishers have moved away from paying the penny rates, as opposed to a
percentage of the license fees they have received.'77 The latter is particularly
174 Independent Music Labels Want EU to Intervene in YouTube Row, REUTERS (June 26, 2014),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/26/us-eu-youtube-impala-idUSKBNOF1 2DJ20 140626; see
also Ed Christman, Disgust, in Digest: The Top Five Reasons Indies Are Mad at YouTube,
BILLBOARD (June 23, 2014), http://www.billboard.com/biz/articles/news/indies/6128773/top-five-
reasons-indies-are-mad-at-youtube (alluding to the "negative most-favored-nation" clause).
175 See Christman, supra note 174 ("Several indies Billboard spoke with are furious at a 'negative
most-favored-nation' clause, which favors the majors. Meaning: If any major label or publisher
agrees to rates that are lower than the indies' rates set forth in the YouTube contract, then Google
will have the right to reduce the indie labels' analogous rate accordingly.").
176 See Bill Briggs, Musicnotes Trumpets 25% Digital Sheet Music Growth, INTERNET RETAILER
(Jan. 28, 2011), http://www.internetretailer.com/2011/01/28/musicnotes-trumpets-25-digital-sheet-
music-growth (reporting about the growth of sales in digital sheet music); Frozen Sheet Music
Breaks Sales Records, MUSICNOTES BLOG (Feb. 24, 2014), http://blog.musicnotes.com/2014/02/24/
news-frozen-sheet-music-breaks-sales-records/ (reporting that sheet music for the song "Let It Go,"
from Disney's animated feature Frozen, "has sold more than 25,000 copies since it was added to
the Musicnotes catalogue early this year").
177 As Donald Passman observed:
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common in international and digital publishing."' Moreover, as Donald Passman
pointed out: "[T]here are only three major manufacturers of secular printed
music in the United States these days, namely Hal Leonard, Alfred, and Music
Sales. That means that, unless [the] publisher is one of these companies, it will
be licensing print rights to one of them."' 79
Nevertheless, this bonus question is quite important from the standpoint
of understanding copyright law and the music business. The answer illustrates
the archaic and path-dependent nature of some music business practices. It also
reminds us of the need to understand both the laws governing music
compositions and sound recordings as well as the business established around
these laws. In addition, it shows, somewhat paradoxically, that the old can be
new again. As shown in the contracts YouTube recently offered to the indie
labels, LFN, or negative MFN, treatments are still alive and well in the digital
environment.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In his widely used book on entertainment industry economics, Harold
Vogel observed:
[M]usic is the most easily personalized and accessible form of
entertainment, and it readily pervades virtually every culture and
every level of society. Indeed, prior to the advent of recording
technology, music was an integral and inseparable part of the
social fabric. As such, music may be considered the most
fundamental of all the entertainment businesses. 8
Music is undeniably an essential part of our culture, but it is also a major
business. As with all twenty-first century businesses-a multi-billion one no
less-the music industry is heavily affected by copyright law. The more we
know about this law, the more we will know about the operation of the music
business. Such knowledge, in turn, will allow us to better understand the link
between copyright law and the music (and culture) we now have.
Except for one major publisher, the penny terms now only apply to sheet music
actually manufactured and distributed by the publisher .... [M]ost every
publisher now licenses out their print rights, meaning the writer gets 50% of the
money paid by the printer to the publisher, and not these stupid penny rates. In
fact, some publishers are doing away with the penny rates altogether and
splitting the licensed incomes, or paying the same royalty as they pay on folios
PASSMAN, supra note 32, at 279.
178 See id. ("With respect to digital print rights, the publishers treat the income just like any other
licensed income, and the writer gets 50%.").
179 Id. at 278.
180 VOGEL, supra note 117, at 244 (footnotes omitted).
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In recent years, there have been extensive discussions about the need for
copyright law reform. Such reform is important because it affects the different
stakeholders within the field-be they record labels, music publishers,
professional songwriters, recording artists, individual users, retail stores, online
service providers, or other third-party intermediaries. The reform is also
important because it will not only affect our creative experience, but also the
culture we end up with. In examining six questions concerning copyright law
and the music business, this article shows how copyright law reform could affect
the music we pay for and listen to. It not only illustrates the unintended, and oft-
unexpected, reach of copyright law, but also why the public at large, including
individual users, have high stakes in copyright law reform.

